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Abstract
Vega-Redondo (1997) showed that imitation leads to the Walrasian
outcome in Cournot Oligopoly. We generalize his result to aggrega-
tive quasi-submodular games. Examples are the Cournot Oligopoly,
Bertrand games with diﬀerentiated complementary products, Common-
Pool Resource games, Rent-Seeking games and generalized Nash-Demand
games.
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stability.
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Vega-Redondo (1997) showed that imitators in a symmetric ﬁnite n-ﬁrm
Cournot Oligopoly with strictly decreasing inverse demand for a homoge-
neous good converge to the Walrasian outcome. This result is rather striking
since the Cournot Nash equilibrium appears to be very robust. Imitators
mimic the action of a most successful player in the previous round. The ad-
justment process has inertia, that is not every period all players will adjust
their actions. Players are allowed to make mistakes, i.e. with a small prob-
ability they randomize with full support. The imitation dynamics is a ﬁnite
Markov chain that is perturbed by mistakes. Vega-Redondo (1997) showed
that as the noise goes to zero, the unique invariant distribution converges to
the Walrasian outcome. The key factor to understand this result is that a
player adjusting towards the Walrasian outcome may decrease his payoﬀ but
decreases the opponents’ payoﬀs even further.
We generalize Vega-Redondo’s result to symmetric ﬁnite aggregative games
that are quasi-submodular in a player’s action and the aggregate of all play-
ers’ actions. E.g., if a player prefers an action to a lower action for a given
aggregate of all players’ actions, then he must also prefer this action to the
lower action for a lower aggregate. In short, we show that Vega-Redondo’s
result applies to a wider class of games than just Cournot games.
As in Vega-Redondo (1997), our analysis makes use of stochastic stability
analysis. However, instead of using the basic graph theoretic arguments
applied by Kandori, Rob, and Mailath (1993) and Young (1993), we employ
as a short cut the concept of recurrent set (see Samuelson, 1997).
12 Submodularity
A lattice is a partially order set hX,<i whose least upper bound and greatest
lower bound are deﬁned by x0 ∨ x00 = sup{x0,x00} and x0 ∧ x00 = inf{x0,x00},
for all x0,x00 ∈ X respectively. For example, if X is the product of several
ordered sets, one may deﬁne x0 ∨x00 (likewise x0 ∧x00) as the component-wise
max (min) to deﬁne a lattice. Note that the direct product of a lattice is a
lattice, i.e. if X is a lattice then so is X2 = X × X. A real valued function








The function f is called strictly submodular if the inequality holds strictly
for all unordered x0,x00 ∈ X. The function f is called quasi-submodular on















Note that submodularity implies quasi-submodularity but not vice versa (see
Topkis, 1998).
Deﬁnition 1 (Aggregative Quasi-Submodular game). A symmetric
(ﬁnite) strategic game Γ = hN,S,a,πi is called aggregative quasi-submodular
if
(i) N = {1,...,n} is the ﬁnite set of players,
(ii) the set of actions Si, ∀i ∈ N, is a totally ordered (ﬁnite) lattice,
(iii) the aggregator ai : ×j∈NSj −→ T, T being a totally ordered (ﬁnite) lat-
tice, is strictly isotone and invariant to permutations of its arguments1,
1The function ai : ×j∈NSj −→ T is invariant to permutations of its arguments if
2(iv) the payoﬀ function πi : S × T −→ R is quasi-submodular in (s,t),





























(v) the action sets and payoﬀ functions are symmetric, i.e. Si = S and
πi = π, ∀i ∈ N.
Examples of the class of aggregative quasi-submodular games are as fol-
lows:
Example 1. (Cournot Oligopoly with a homogeneous good) The
payoﬀ function is π(s,t) = p(t)s − c(s) with s being interpreted as a ﬁrm’s
quantity, p being a strictly decreasing inverse demand function and c a cost
function (see also Schipper, 2001). The aggregator is simply the total quan-
tity over all ﬁrms a(s1,...,sn) = Σi∈Nsi .
Example 2. (Cournot Oligopoly with diﬀerentiated substitute prod-
ucts) The payoﬀ function is πi(si,t) = pi(si,t)si − c(si). Goods are substi-





i with 0 < βθ < 1, θ < 1




Example 3. (Bertrand Oligopoly with diﬀerentiated complemen-
tary products) The payoﬀ function is πi(si,t) = di(si,t)si−c(di(si,t)) with
ai(s1,...,sn) = ai(sb(1),...,sb(n)) for all bijections b : N −→ N.
3si being interpreted as the price for the good of ﬁrm i, di being the demand




























j=1sj)2] if si > 0 and π(0,0) = ce with
c,e,a,b ∈ R++ (see Walker, Gardner, and Ostrom, 1990). Each appropriator
i ∈ N has an endowment e that can be invested in the Common-Pool Re-
source or in an outside activity with marginal payoﬀ c. si denotes appropria-






j=1sj)2]. The aggregator is a(s1,...,sn) = Σn
j=1sj.





jv − si with si ≥ 0 and 0 < r < 1. Contestants compete for the rent v





j but the cost of bidding
equals the bid (see Hehenkamp, Leininger, and Possajennikov, 2001). The
aggregator is a(s1,...,sn) = Σn
j=1sr
j.
Example 6. (Generalized Nash-Demand game) The payoﬀ function
is π(s,t) = p(t)s. The demand of a player is s. The probability of getting
the demand is p(t) which is strictly decreasing in the total of demands of all
players Σn
j=1sj. The aggregator is a(s1,...,sn) = Σn
j=1sj.
43 Imitation Dynamics
Time is discrete and indexed by τ = 0,1,2,....
Deﬁnition 2 (Imitator). 2 An imitator i ∈ N chooses with full support
from the set
DI(τ − 1) := {s ∈ S : ∃j ∈ N s.t. s = sj(τ − 1) and
∀k ∈ N,πj(τ − 1) ≥ πk(τ − 1)}. (6)
An imitator mimics the action of the player(s) with highest payoﬀ in the
previous period. At every time τ = 1,2,..., each player i ∈ N is assumed to
revise his former action si(τ − 1) with a common i.i.d. probability ρ ∈ (0,1)
according to the imitation rule. Initially in τ = 0 players start with any
arbitrary action within the action set S.
The process induced by the imitation dynamics is a discrete time ﬁ-
nite Markov chain on the state-space Sn = ×i∈NSi. Each state ω(τ) =
(s1(τ),s2(τ),...,sn(τ)) induces a proﬁt-proﬁle (π1(τ),π2(τ),...,πn(τ)). The
Markov operator is deﬁned in the standard way as transition probability ma-
trix P = (pωω0)ω,ω0∈Sn with pωω0 = prob{ω0|ω}, pωω0 ≥ 0, ω,ω0 ∈ Sn and
P
ω0∈Sn pωω0 = 1, ∀ω ∈ Sn.
At every output revision opportunity τ, each player follows the imitation
rule with probability (1−ε), ε ∈ (0,η], where η is small, but with probability
ε he randomizes (“mutates”) with full support S. This noise makes the
perturbed Markov chain P(ε) irreducible and ergodic. This implies that there
exists a unique invariant distribution ϕ(ε) on Sn (see for example Masaaki,
1997). We focus on the unique limiting invariant distribution ϕ∗ of P deﬁned
by ϕ(ε)P(ε) = ϕ(ε), ϕ∗ := limε→0 ϕ(ε) and ϕ∗P = ϕ∗. This long run
2See also Vega-Redondo (1997), p. 378.
5distribution determines the average proportion of time spent in each state of
the state-space in the long run (see Samuelson, 1997, for an introduction).
Consider ε = 0 and deﬁne an absorbing set A ⊆ Sn by
(i) ∀ω ∈ A, ∀ω0 / ∈ A, pωω0 = 0 and
(ii) ∀ω,ω0 ∈ A, ∃m ∈ N, m ﬁnite, s.t. p
(m)
ωω0 > 0, p
(m)
ωω0 being the m-step
transition probability from ω to ω0.
Let Z be the collection of all A in Sn.
We call states ω and ω0 adjacent if exactly one mutation can change the
state from ω to ω0 (and vice versa). The set of all states adjacent to the state
ω is the single mutation neighborhood of ω denoted by M(ω). The basin of
attraction of an absorbing set A is the set B(A) = {ω ∈ Sn|∃m ∈ N,∃ω0 ∈
A s.t. p
(m)
ωω0 > 0}. A recurrent set R is a minimal collection of absorbing sets
with the property that there do not exist absorbing sets A ∈ R and A0 / ∈ R
such that ∀ω ∈ A, M(ω)∩B(A0) 6= ∅. We will make use of following lemma.
Lemma 1 (N¨ oldeke and Samuelson). Given a perturbed ﬁnite Markov
chain, then at least one recurrent set exists. Recurrent sets are disjoint.
Let the state ω be contained in the support of the unique limiting invariant
distribution ϕ∗. Then ω ∈ R, R being a recurrent set. Moreover, ∀ω0 ∈ R,
ϕ∗(ω0) > 0.
For a proof see for example Samuelson (1997), Lemma 7.1 and Proposition
7.7., proof pp. 236-238.
64 Result
Deﬁnition 3 (Walrasian outcome). ω∗ = (s∗
1,...,s∗
n) is a Walrasian out-




∗),∀s ∈ S. (7)
The Walrasian outcome describes a solution in which the player does not
perceive the externality of his action. An example is price-taking behavior.
Theorem. Given imitators with inertia and noise in an aggregative quasi-
submodular game, let the Walrasian outcome ω∗ ∈ Sn exist uniquely. Then
ϕ∗(ω∗) = 1.
The proof follows from below lemmatas. Recall that Z is the collection
of absorbing sets.
Lemma 2. Z = {Aω = {ω} : ω = (s,...,s) ∈ Sn for some s ∈ S}.
Proof. By symmetry of Γ, we have by DI for every ω = (s,...,s) ∈ Sn
that pωω = 1 and pωω0 = 0, ∀ω0 6= ω. Conversely, since at any τ and i.i.d.
probability ρ > 0, there is positive probability that all ﬁrms adjust towards
the same action in DI(τ − 1) given any arbitrary ω(τ − 1). 
Lemma 3. M(ω) ∩ B({ω∗}) 6= ∅, ∀{ω} ∈ Z\{ω∗}.
Proof. By assumption ω∗ is unique and by Lemma 2, Aω∗ = {ω∗}. Consider
any absorbing set (state) A 6= Aω∗. We claim that starting in any A 6= {ω∗} a
single (suitable) mutation can lead the dynamics to B({ω∗}). It is suﬃcient
to show that ∀s ∈ S, s 6= s∗, k ∈ N, k ≤ n,
π(s
∗,t) > π(s,t), (8)
7with t = a(s∗
1,...,s∗
k,sk+1,...,sn). a is strictly isotone and invariant to per-
mutations of it’s arguments. π is quasi-submodular. Set s∗ ≡ s0, s ≡ s00,
t ≡ t0 and t∗ ≡ t00. Note that the left-hand side of Formulas (4) and (5)
is the deﬁnition of the Walrasian outcome in the Inequality (7) whereas the
right-hand side is the above Inequality (8) (for s ≺ s∗ the upper Formula (4)
and for s  s∗ the lower Formula (5)). Setting k = 1 yields the desired claim
and completes the proof of the lemma. 
Lemma 4. M(ω∗) ∩ B(A) = ∅, ∀A ∈ Z, A 6= {ω∗}.
Proof. By setting k = n − 1 in Inequality (8), it follows that more than
one mutation is needed to escape Aω∗ since players setting s∗ are still better
oﬀ after just one mutation. 
From previous lemmata follows that R = {ω∗}. Thus by Lemma 1,
ϕ∗(ω∗) = 1. This completes the proof of the Theorem.
Note that just a single suitable mutation is required to trigger the con-
vergence to the long run outcome. Hence, the convergence is rather fast
compared to many results in the literature obtained by the same method.
5 Conclusions
We generalize Vega-Redondo’s (1997) result to a class of aggregative quasi-
submodular games. Examples of this class are many games with strategic
substitutes. The result provides an evolutionary foundation for Walrasian
behavior in an important class of non-cooperative games. Schipper (2001)
also uses quasi-submodularity to prove that imitators are strictly better oﬀ
than are best-response-players in Cournot oligopoly. This result too applies
to aggregative quasi-submodular games.
8References
[1] Hehenkamp, B., Leininger, W. and A. Possajennikov, 2001, Evolutionary rent-
seeking, mimeo, University of Dortmund.
[2] Kandori, M., Mailath, G. J. and R. Rob, 1993, Learning, mutation and long
run equilibria in games, Econometrica 61, 29-56.
[3] Masaaki, K., 1997, Markov processes for stochastic modeling (Chapman &
Hall, London).
[4] Samuelson, L., 1997, Evolutionary games and equilibrium selection (The MIT
Press, Cambridge, M.A.).
[5] Schipper, B. C., 2001, Imitators and optimizers in symmetric n-ﬁrm Cournot
oligopoly, mimeo, University of Bonn.
[6] Topkis, D. M., 1998, Supermodularity and complementarity (Princeton Uni-
versity Press, Princeton, N. J.).
[7] Vega-Redondo, F., 1997, The evolution of Walrasian behavior, Econometrica
65, 375-384.
[8] Vives, X., 2000, Oligopoly pricing: Old ideas and new tools (The MIT Press,
Cambridge, M.A.).
[9] Walker, J. M., Gardner, R. and E. Ostrom (1990). Rent dissipation in a
limited-access Common-Pool resource: Experimental evidence, Journal of En-
vironmental Economics and Management 19, 203-211.
[10] Young, H. P., 1993, The evolution of conventions, Econometrica 61, 57-84.
9